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Defection 
 
Synonyms 
 Non-cooperative, cheating, selfish, exploitative, free-riding 
 
Definition 
 An action that can increase an individual’s payoff but that results in a 
socially inefficient outcome. 
 
Introduction 
 In social interactions there is often a conflict between what is 
immediately good for the individual as opposed to what is good for the group 
of interacting individuals as a whole. Such situations are known as social 
dilemma (Dawes, 1980), and arise because actions that immediately benefit 
one individual may nevertheless lead to inefficient outcomes. Consider trade 
or exchange, for example. Cooperation would involve fairly representing the 
goods being offered, and honoring the terms of the exchange by, for example, 
not simply taking the goods of the other party by force and giving nothing in 
return. Defection, on the other hand, would involve misrepresenting the goods 
being offered or taking the goods of the other party by force. Although the 
total payoff to the pair of traders is maximized by cooperating, either individual 
can immediately gain by defecting. This occurs even though defection leads 
to an inefficient outcome in which each individual is worse off than if they had 
cooperated.  
But yet no society would function if individuals always defected and did 
not cooperate. This problem occurs across biological taxa, from 
microorganisms through to social insects and humans. A vast body of 
research in anthropology, computer science, economics, evolutionary biology 
and sociology, as well as evolutionary and social psychology, is concerned 
with finding conditions that take away the benefits of defection and promote 
cooperation.  
 
Formalizing defection using game theory 
The outcomes of defection for the actor and for the group are 
commonly formalized using game theory, which uses mathematical models to 
analyze the outcomes of strategic interactions between individuals. Table 1 
shows the payoff matrix for a single-shot two-player interaction, in which each 
individual may either cooperate or defect. The game is symmetric, meaning 
that the identity of the players can be swapped without affecting the outcome.  
The payoff that a player receives is a measure of reward. This reward could 
correspond to a psychological reward or the economic concept of utility, or to 
biological or cultural fitness. Individuals are therefore assumed to try to 
choose actions that maximize their own payoff, whether this is through 
learning the consequences of actions, or through genetic or cultural evolution. 
In this payoff matrix 𝑅 represents the reward for mutual cooperation; 𝑆 
represents the sucker’s payoff that the actor receives when it cooperates but 
its partner defects; 𝑇 represents the temptation to defect – the payoff the actor 
receives when its partner cooperates but it defects on that cooperation; and 𝑃 
represents the punishment payoff for mutual defection. When 𝑅 > 𝑃 mutual 
cooperation leads to a higher payoff for each player than mutual defection. 
If 2𝑅 > 𝑆 + 𝑇 and 𝑅 > 𝑆 then mutual cooperation yields the highest total 
payoff for the pair, and is hence the most efficient outcome. Given that these 
inequalities hold, social dilemmas occur when: 1. Unilateral defection gives a 
higher payoff to the defector than mutual cooperation (𝑇 > 𝑅), and/or 2. 
Mutual defection gives a higher payoff than unilateral cooperation (𝑃 > 𝑆).  
Where only condition 1 holds, this is known as a Snowdrift or Chicken game. 
Where only condition 2 holds, this is known as a Stag Hunt game. Where both 
conditions 1 and 2 hold, the situation is a Prisoner’s Dilemma.  In all of these 
games there is a tension between defection, which can give a higher payoff to 
the individual, and cooperation, which gives a socially efficient state. This 
leads to the question of why individuals would not defect. 
 
Table 1: The payoff matrix for two-player symmetric games. Payoffs 
shown are for Player 1. 
 Player 2 chooses 
Cooperate 
Player 2 chooses  
Defect 
Player 1 chooses 
Cooperate 
𝑅 𝑆 
Player 1 chooses  
Defect 
𝑇 𝑃 
 
Theories for why individuals would not defect: kinship and reciprocity 
Much of evolutionary psychology is concerned with the evolved 
psychology of human hunter-gatherers. The hunter-gatherer social 
environment of living in small, mobile foraging groups (Boehm, 1999) 
corresponds to the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness in which our 
species has spent most of its evolutionary time. In this environment 
individuals relied heavily on cooperation with their group mates in order to 
obtain food for themselves and their families. This would have resulted in a 
value of 𝑅 in Table 1 much greater than 𝑃.  Evolutionary psychology then 
draws upon two classes of theory for why defection would not be favored.  
The first is kinship. Individuals would often interact with their extended 
families. In such cases, the theory of kin selection from evolutionary biology 
(Hamilton, 1964) tells us that a genetic predisposition to cooperate rather than 
defect can be favored due to the fact that relatives share genes. This means 
that when interactions are between relatives, a gene to cooperate helps 
copies of itself in other individuals and so spreads in the population. In other 
words, when interactions are between genetic relatives then individuals in 
cooperative families will enjoy the payoff 𝑅, whereas individuals in families 
that defect will receive the smaller payoff 𝑃. The same argument can also 
apply when the tendency to cooperate or defect is transmitted culturally 
through social learning, rather than genetically. In that case we can speak of 
the cultural relatedness between interacting individuals (Boyd & Richerson, 
2011). 
The second, and complementary, theory is reciprocity. This theory 
originates from classical game theory in economics. It arises from the 
observation that social interactions are typically not one time only, single-shot. 
Rather, most interactions are in fact repeated. Formally, the game in Table 1 
then represents a stage game that is repeated for a number of rounds. 
Repeated games allow for conditional strategies in which individuals 
condition their own actions on the past actions of their partner. A strategy 
specifies the action that an individual will take for a given history of its 
partner’s actions. The Folk Theorem of game theory (see for example 
Binmore, 2005) tells us that if the interaction is repeated for an indefinite 
length of time, and if individuals have sufficient knowledge of the past actions 
of their partners, then any strategy which gives more than the minimax payoff 
can be an equilibrium. The minimax payoff is the payoff that a player receives 
when its partner tries to minimize that payoff. In Table 1, the minimax payoff 
would be the payoff that an individual receives if its partner always defects. 
Consequently, any strategy in which individuals do not always defect results 
in a higher payoff to each individual. Such a strategy can therefore be an 
equilibrium even when individuals are concerned with only maximizing their 
own payoffs. The reason is that any individual who deviates from the strategy 
can be punished by having its payoff reduced to the minimax payoff through 
defection by its partners. If an individual defected then it would subsequently 
always receive defection from other individuals, limiting its future payoffs to 𝑃 
or 𝑆, which are both smaller than the payoff 𝑅 from mutual cooperation. The 
threat of being defected against can therefore stabilize cooperation when 
interactions are repeated.  
This theory of cooperation under repeated interactions was later 
popularized in evolutionary biology by Trivers (1971). The Tit-for-Tat strategy 
advocated by Axelrod (1984) is one example of a conditional strategy. 
However, in general there will be a very large number of other strategies that 
give more than the minimax payoff and so which can also be equilibria.   
What is needed for this result to apply in a real-world scenario is that 
the game is indefinitely repeated and that individuals have sufficient 
information about the past actions of their partners. In hunter-gatherers 
interactions were effectively repeated for an indefinite number of times. This is 
because individuals relied on interactions with their group mates to survive, 
and no individual could predict the time of its death. Individuals also lived in 
close-knit communities where they repeatedly interacted with the same 
individuals. This made it easy for them to obtain information about the past 
actions of other group members. 
 
The effect of defection on the evolved psychology of humans 
The social environment of hunter-gatherers would have selected for 
psychological traits to detect defectors. Individuals would be selected to have 
a propensity to obtain and spread information about the actions of other group 
members, for example through gossip. The spread of information would be 
facilitated by certain institutional rules that groups developed (North, 1990). 
An example of this is the institutional rule of the whole group discussing 
around a campfire each evening. Individuals would also become sensitive to 
what other individuals thought about themselves, i.e. their reputation. 
Because the Folk Theorem demonstrates that there will be a large 
number of possible equilibria, individuals would also be selected to coordinate 
their actions to ensure that they reached an equilibrium that yielded a high 
payoff to them. In other words, each individual would benefit from its group 
coordinating on an equilibrium in which cooperation was frequent and 
defection rare. This would select for individuals to create institutional rules and 
norms that coordinated actions onto a high payoff equilibrium. For example, 
by using low cost coordinated punishment against acts of defection, such as 
ridicule and ostracism (Boehm, 1999).   
 
Defection in large-scale societies 
The origin of agriculture led to individuals living in much larger social 
groups. This meant that there was a lower genetic relatedness between 
interacting individuals. It also meant that it became harder for individuals to 
obtain information about the past actions of group members. Why, then, is 
defection not more frequent in large-scale societies? Some scholars argue 
that defection would actually be individually advantageous, but that individuals 
do not defect because they still carry the evolved psychological traits from our 
past hunter-gatherer environment. Under this account, our evolved 
psychology is “misfiring” in the new environment of large-scale societies. This 
“misfire” argument was popularized by Dawkins (1976). Other scholars 
contend that defection is not advantageous even in large-scale societies, 
because groups have created institutions that still allow the conditions of 
cooperation under the Folk Theorem to be satisfied (e.g. Greif, 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
The possibility of defection threatens the potential gains from 
cooperation. The ecological and social environment of hunter-gatherers would 
have selected for traits that supported cooperation through kinship and 
reciprocity.  This would include equipping individuals with a psychology that 
made them sensitive to their own reputation and the reputation of others. It 
would also have favored traits that facilitate the spread of information about 
the past actions of group members, such as gossip. To what extent these 
traits continue to be adaptive in the new environment of large-scale societies 
is a current research question. 
 
 
Cross-references (Evolution Of Cooperation, Tit-For-Tat Cooperation, 
Reciprocal Altruism And Cooperation For Mutual Benefit, Robert Axelrod’s 
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Game Theory, Cooperation Varies With Genetic Relatedness, Reputation and 
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